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1. Aristotle 
JUSSI BACKMAN 
 
Homo Sacer, Giorgio Agamben’s transformative twenty-year project in political ontology, 
is framed at its very outset in terms of Aristotelian philosophy – read, as we will see, 
from a strongly medieval, Heideggerian and Arendtian perspective. As a locus classicus of 
the juxtaposition of the two Greek terms for life, zōē (‘the simple fact of living common 
to all living beings’) and bios (‘the form or way of living proper to an individual or a 
group’), Agamben (HS 1–2) cites a passage in Aristotle’s Politics that notes that there is a 
certain ‘natural delight (euēmeria) and sweetness’ in the ‘mere fact of being alive itself’ (to 
zēn auto monon), which makes human beings hold on to it for its own sake, provided that 
the mode of life (bios) that this being-alive amounts to is not fraught with excessive 
difficulty.1  
The complicated interlacing of zōē and bios defines the fundamental parameters of 
Agamben’s magnum opus. We will use them here as the starting point for a brief 
discussion of Agamben’s engagement, throughout the Homo Sacer series, with the 
Aristotelian foundations of Western political thought and its basic strategy of ‘dividing 
the factical experience and pushing down to the origin – that is, excluding – one half of 
it in order then to rearticulate it to the other by including it as foundation’ (UB 265). 
This strategy is particularly visible in the two Aristotelian conceptual divisions whose 
political consequences Homo Sacer never ceases to address: that between ‘bare’ and 
politically qualified life and that between potential and act, dynamis and energeia. We will 
see that Agamben’s concept of ‘form-of-life’ (forma-di-vita), introduced in Homo Sacer 
(HS 188), is designed to deconstruct or ‘deactivate’ both of these interlocking 
oppositions. 
 
BEING-ALIVE SAID IN MANY WAYS: zēn/eu zēn 
We should, however, begin our discussion with a caveat. Contrary to what Agamben 
seems to suggest (HS 11), zōē and bios are in no way contrasted in the passage cited 
above. Characterizing their relationship as an ‘opposition’ (HS 66), as a ‘fundamental 
categorial pair of Western politics’ (HS 8), or as a ‘classical distinction’ (HS 187), gives 
rise to certain interpretive and philological objections, such as those put forward by J. 
G. Finlayson.2 Finlayson shows that Agamben starts out from Hannah Arendt’s 
somewhat simplifying account of the ‘specifically human life’ as the narrated and 
biographical ‘bios as distinguished from mere zōē’.3 Such a distinction does occasionally 
appear in late antiquity, but in Aristotle and in other classical texts, zōē and bios are not 
opposed in this way.4 They simply differ in sense: whereas zōē is the simple fact and 
process of being-alive, bios is the ‘mode of life’ enacted by a living being in and through 
this process. What is essential to bios is temporal extension: while zōē is what is going on 
at every given instant of being alive, bios is the characteristic life-project that this being 
alive amounts to over an extended period of time, or the entire biographical ‘span of 
life’ reaching all the way from birth to death and fully visible only in retrospect.5 The 
reason for the fact, noted by Agamben (HS 2), that the verb bioō is in classical texts 
almost never found in the present tense, is that it does not have a primarily presential 
sense of an ongoing process, but rather the perfective sense of ‘having passed or 
constituted one’s life in a certain manner (over a span of time)’.6 This sense of 
completeness and limitation inherent in bios also explains why Aristotle does not ascribe 
a bios to the ‘continuous and everlasting being-alive’ (zōē synechēs kai aidios) of the 
metaphysical divinity.7  
It follows that bios is neither an alternative to zōē nor something over and above it. 
By virtue of the fact of being alive, one cannot fail, over time, to realize some kind of 
bios.8 A political mode of life, bios politikos, is one such possible life-project, as is the life 
of contemplation (bios theōrētikos), but even the life of enjoyment (bios apolaustikos), 
which Aristotle disdainfully regards as a mode of life ‘fit for cattle’, constitutes a bios.9 
Even though the bioi that primarily interest the philosophers are those of free human 
beings, they by no means limit bios to humans: animals and even plants implement their 
particular bioi.10 Moreover, as Agamben is well aware (UB 200–6), even though Aristotle 
may be the first to use zōē as an abstract term for that which separates animate from 
inanimate things, in De anima he explicitly denies that there is such a thing as generic 
being alive that would be shared in a univocal sense by plants, animals and human 
beings.11 Being-alive (zēn) is ‘said in many ways (pleonachōs)’ and the soul (psychē), the 
animating principle of vital functions, is analogous to a polygon in that, just as there is 
no abstract polygon apart from determinate types such as triangles and squares, no 
generic soul exists apart from the three basic types: the vegetative (threptikon) vitality of 
plants, consisting merely in the intake of nutrition and organic growth; the sensory and 
mobile vitality of nonhuman animals; and the discursive-rational vitality of humans.12  
To be sure, vegetative life is the most elementary form of zēn in that it is capable 
of separate existence in plants and is ‘contained’ in the more complex levels, since 
animals and humans are also capable of nourishment and growth, but as only 
potentially (dynamei), not actually, separable.13 No separate layer of ‘bare life’ can be 
extracted intact from the human soul. For beings endowed with a human soul, life is 
always already irreducibly human: in it, the ‘inferior’ vital functions have always already 
been qualitatively transformed in their seamless fusion with the discursive being alive of 
humans. Nonetheless, differentiating vitality into its different component faculties is 
possible conceptually (logō), and Agamben will insist (UB 202–6) that precisely this 
conceptual, potential divisibility is the basis for the political ‘exclusive inclusion’ of that 
which is in reality inseparable, of ‘bare’ life.14 This political exclusion begins with 
Aristotle’s own exclusion of vegetative life from human virtue (aretē), discursive reason 
(logos) and flourishing (eudaimonia), and culminates in the modern techniques for actually 
sustaining ‘bare’ vital functions through resuscitation or for producing ‘bare life’ in the 
figure of the Muselmann of Nazi camps (RA 41–86; UB 204).15  
In the case of Aristotle, the zōē/bios distinction thus boils down to that between 
two kinds of zōē, between mere survival and ‘living well’ (eu zēn). It is initially for the 
sake of the former, Aristotle maintains, that human beings form more and more 
complex communities and finally come to live in a politically structured community. 
However, even when material survival has been secured by the economic, military and 
judicial framework of the polis, the political community persists as a teleological project, 
since it further allows humans to pursue a life of fulfilment and flourishing as human 
beings.16 The polis ‘comes to be [ginomenē] for the sake of living [zēn] but is [ousa] for the 
sake of living well [eu zēn]’.17 The latter cannot consist in any sense of being alive that is 
not unique to free human beings: there can be no polis of slaves or non-human animals, 
whose life is subject to the external compulsion of commands and instincts and 
deprived of the rational self-determination and self-sufficiency (autarkeia) that 
constitutes ‘accomplished’ being-alive (zōē teleia).18 Such complete zōē is one that 
constitutes a temporally extended span of life (bios teleios) consisting in the 
accomplishment of the ‘work’ or function (ergon) proper to the human being: the 
activity or ‘being-at-work’ (energeia) of the human soul (psychē) in terms of the supreme 
virtues or excellences (aretai) of its properly human – that is, discursive (meta logou) – 
aspects.19 Aristotle stresses the importance of the actual use or employment (chrēsis) of 
virtue, as opposed to merely having virtue as a potential (dynamis), as a habit/disposition 
(hexis) or possession (ktēsis).20 On the other hand, as ‘habits’, virtues – unlike natural or 
innate capacities, in which the potential precedes the activity – are only acquired 
through a prior exercise (energein) in the form of instruction (didaskalia) or habituation 
(ethos).21 
 
THE INCAPACITY OF CAPACITY: dynamis/energeia 
From these considerations, we see to what extent the Aristotelian hierarchy of life is 
pervaded by the dialectic of potential and act. In Homo Sacer, Agamben notes that 
reconsidering the problem of constituent and constituted power and their subjugation 
to the concept of sovereign power  
 
opens the way for a new articulation of the relation between potential 
[potenza] and act [atto]. […] Until a new and coherent ontology of potential 
[…] has replaced the ontology founded on the primacy of act and its 
relation to potential, a political theory freed from the aporias of sovereignty 
remains unthinkable. (HS 44; translation modified) 
 
This task of a new ontology of potentiality, emancipated from the primacy of act, 
frames Agamben’s discussion of dynamis and energeia; among his precursors in this 
project he mentions Spinoza, Schelling, Nietzsche and Heidegger (HS 44, 48). Indeed, 
his reading of the Aristotelian dynamis is decisively influenced by Heidegger’s 1931 
lecture course on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Theta (see PO 201).22 The 
reappropriation of dynamis in Heideggerian fundamental ontology, for which ‘higher 
than actuality [Wirklichkeit] stands possibility [Möglichkeit]’, is clearly an orienting template 
for Agamben’s attempt to think power and life beyond the classical Aristotelian 
hierarchies.23 
Aristotle’s distinction between potential and act is motivated by his quest to 
conceptually grasp movement, change and transition, kinēsis and metabolē. Kinēsis is the 
principal context for understanding potential and act, and the primary sense of dynamis 
is to be a principle (archē) of transition in another entity, or in the same entity qua other: 
the doctor is capable of treating herself, but only to the extent that she is also a 
patient.24 Every transition thus involves two capacities, the capacity to produce (poiein) a 
process and the capacity to undergo (paschein) it. This distinction is the key to Aristotle’s 
statement – a focal point of Agamben’s attention (CC 34; HS 45–6; PO 181–3, 201, 
215, 245; OD 94–5; UB 59, 276) – that since ‘to the extent that something is constituted 
as one [sympephyken], it does not itself undergo [paschei; any transition produced] by 
itself’, every capacity (dynamis) is, by consequence, also ‘an incapacity [adynamia] of the 
same [activity] and in the same respect’.25 This seemingly paradoxical statement is 
clarified by Aristotle’s remark, in De anima, that the faculty of sensory perception is 
incapable of perceiving itself without access to a separate sensory object, just as the 
combustible is incapable of igniting itself without access to heat: the capacity to 
produce or to undergo a process is incapable of carrying out the process by itself.26 The 
two corresponding dynameis must come into contact before energeia is initiated. However, 
as opposed to purely mechanical capacities, this contact alone is not sufficient in the 
case of the discursive capacities of rational beings, oriented to conceptually determinate 
ends – a desire (orexis) or preference (proairesis) to act for the end, rather than not, is also 
required.27  
‘Capable [dynaton] is that which, whenever the activity [energeia] to which it is said 
to have the capacity [dynamin] becomes present [hyparxē] in it, will not be incapable 
[adynaton] in any respect.’28 Heidegger and Agamben (HS 45–6; PO 183, 264) both 
emphasise that in spite of its seeming triviality – what is capable of something is not 
incapable of it – this articulation is highly significant when we understand it in light of 
the incapacity inherent in dynamis.29 Until the conditions for the commencement of the 
activity are met, a potential always retains an impotential that is only surrendered in the 
process of actualisation – either once and for all, as in an action (praxis) such as 
contemplating that is at once its own end and complete (entelecheia), or gradually, as in 
an ‘incomplete’ energeia or kinēsis, a process such as construction that is a production 
(poiēsis) of an end external to the process itself.30 Capacity-for-x is the point of 
departure for the process in which its inherent incapacity-for-x is expelled by the 
coming-to-be of x itself. 
Agamben stresses (CC 35; HS 46; PO 184; UB 267) that this is well captured in a 
passage of De anima that notes that undergoing a process through which an inherent 
potential is actualised is not really an alteration (alloiōsis) so much as a ‘preservation’ 
(sōtēria) of what is potentially (dynamei) by what is completely (entelecheia). Rather than an 
alteration, this is an ‘increase [epidosis] to itself [eis hauto] and to completeness 
[entelecheian]’.31 However, contrary to what Agamben suggests, what is ‘preserved’ in the 
transition from potentiality to actuality is clearly not potentiality as such – Aristotle 
makes it clear that the move is ‘from a potential being [ek dynamei ontos] to 
completeness’32 – but rather the being that is potentially, such as the house under 
construction, whose identity or ‘selfhood’ as a house is preserved and intensified in the 
transition.33 Being in act (energeia on) is determined by the extent to which it has cast off 
the incapacity and the negative capacity inherent in potential being.34 Actual being is 
prior to potential being in terms of the substantial beingness (ousia) of the entity in 
question: a finished house is more of a house than one still being built or one that is 
merely being planned, in the sense of ‘less incapable of being a house’.35 In Aristotle’s 
ontological hierarchy, the most accomplished manifestation of being is necessary and 
everlasting actuality, which has shed all potentiality and, with it, all incompleteness, 
transience and contingency, all impotential and potential-not-to-be.36 
Even though Agamben claims that ‘it is never clear […] whether Book Theta of 
the Metaphysics in fact gives primacy to act or to potential’ (HS 47; translation modified), 
the ontological primacy of energeia in Aristotle thus seems beyond dispute, even though 
it can only be determined in opposition to dynamis as the ‘other’ way of being, as the 
‘not incapable’.37 Agamben is thinking in the direction of the later Aristotelian tradition, 
of the scholastic distinction between God’s absolute power (potentia absoluta) and his 
ordained power (potentia ordinata), which provides the theological background for Abbé 
Sieyès’s distinction between constituent and constituted power (PO 253–5; KG 104–8; 
UB 266–7).38 Whereas God’s omnipotence was conceived by the scholastics as the 
absolutely sovereign source of all normativity, and the created order of nature as 
ultimately contingent in the sense that it is based on the divine will alone and dictated 
by no other necessity, the fact that God has willed the existing order commits and 
ordains divine power not to conflict with the initial decision of the creator. God’s 
absolute or constituent potential thus becomes the ontological source of all inherently 
contingent, created actuality – and, at the same time, a merely retrospective legitimation 
of the existing order, subordinated to what actually exists in the sense that it has 
suspended its capacity for negating the actual and manifests it only in ‘states of 
exception’. In this context, potential and act are indeed ‘only two aspects of the process 
of the sovereign autoconstitution of being [essere]’ in which act presupposes itself as a 
potential that is merely a suspended act, and, on the other hand, act is only a 
‘preservation’ of what already potentially was (UB 267; translation modified). 
It is this medieval model of divine power that underlies the theological paradigm 
of divine ‘economy’ or ‘administration’ of the world, studied in The Kingdom and the Glory 
(KG 53–108), as well as the theological transformation of the ergon of human energeia 
into divinely operated liturgical ‘offices’ or ‘duties’, studied in Opus Dei (OD 42–64, 89–
129), both of which Agamben shows to profoundly inform the modern concept of 
government.39 It is in this framework that we should understand the task of an 
‘ontology of potentiality’ that the Homo Sacer project assigns to itself, that of thinking a 
potential without any relation to being in act (HS 47), a purely ‘destituent’ (destituente) 
potential set free from the logic of sovereignty and constitution (UB 268). Agamben’s 
abiding fascination with Melville’s ‘Bartleby, the Scrivener’ (1853) should be situated in 
this context. Bartleby is the clerk who refuses to actualise his ergon, his function, office, 
or duty, simply because he ‘prefers not to’, thus withholding the proairesis or preference 
determined by Aristotle to be prerequisite for the actualisation of a rational capacity, 
which is always also a ‘capacity not to’. In stubbornly vindicating this negative aspect of 
his dynamis, in refusing to ordain his constituent power into any constituted power and 
thereby rendering it de-constituent or destituent, Bartleby is ‘the strongest objection 
against the principle of sovereignty’ (HS 48; cf. CC 34–6; PO 243–71).40  
 
USE, HABIT AND FORM-OF-LIFE: chrēsis AND hexis 
We find Agamben’s hitherto most sustained attempt to articulate an ontology of 
destituent potential in the concluding volume of the Homo Sacer series, The Use of Bodies. 
Here, Agamben’s strategy is to deconstruct both the zōē/bios (or, rather, zēn/eu zēn) and 
the dynamis/energeia distinctions, and to flesh out his concept of ‘form-of-life’ with the 
help of the concept of use (uso). Already in The Highest Poverty, Agamben suggests that, 
had it been properly articulated, the Franciscan notion of non-appropriative use ‘could 
have been configured as a tertium with respect to law and life, potential and act’ (HP 
141). This suggestion is reiterated more forcefully in The Use of Bodies: 
 
[W]hat if use […] implied, with respect to potential, a relationship other 
than energeia? […] What if use in fact implied an ontology irreducible to the 
Aristotelian duality of potential and act that, through its historical translations, still 
governs Western culture? (UB 48, original italics) 
 
The Use of Bodies sets out from the Aristotelian concept of use or employment (chrēsis), 
which, Agamben notes, Aristotle tends to use as a synonym of act, energeia: to use a 
capacity is to put a potential into work, to make it serve its function or purpose (ergon; 
UB 5–7). Thus, in the case of capacities whose employment constitutes an activity 
(praxis) that is its own end, such as seeing, the employment itself is the ultimate ergon, 
but in the case of production (poiēsis), the employment of one’s capacity is an 
instrumental process towards the ergon (UB 12–13).41 From this perspective, Agamben 
shows (UB 3–23), Aristotle’s account of the work (ergon) of the slave as the ‘use of the 
body’ (hē tou sōmatos chrēsis) is an interesting anomaly.42 While Aristotle regards 
hypothetical ‘natural’ slaves as human beings, they are clearly a limiting case or, as 
Agamben would have it, a ‘threshold’: they belong to the community (koinōnein) of 
human logos insofar as they are able to ‘perceive’ or ‘grasp’ discursive reason (they 
understand commands and their rationale), but just as they do not belong to themselves 
but to another, they do not possess (echein) reason as an independent faculty at their 
disposal, lacking rational deliberation and initiative.43 Thus, the ‘work’ of slaves qua 
slaves cannot be that of human beings in general – the free activity of the discursive 
faculties of the soul – but consists simply in making use of their bodies as animate 
instruments and in being used to uphold the autarchy of their master’s ‘way of life’ (bios) 
by liberating it from the necessities of survival.44 As an instrument of the master’s bios, 
the activity of the slave is thus, Agamben notes (UB 18–21), a very peculiar ‘work’ or 
‘function’, in that it is neither praxis nor poiēsis, neither an end in itself or a process 
towards an end. It is a sheer routine of toil and labour, devoid of intrinsic 
purposiveness. The work (ergon) through which slaves constitute themselves as slaves 
thus lies beyond the teleological matrix of the dynamis/energeia distinction; it represents a 
‘paradigm of another human activity […] for which we lack names’ (UB 78). 
Through studies of the polysemy of the Greek verb chrēsthai and the Latin uti as 
well as their medial and passive voices, of the affinity between ‘use’ and ‘care’, of the 
Heideggerian understanding of the use of the world, and of the Stoic concept of ‘use of 
oneself’, Agamben delineates a Foucauldian understanding of use as a ‘constitution of 
the self’ in relation to what is other than the self: ‘The self is nothing other than use-of-oneself 
[uso di sé]’ (UB 54, original italics). This brings him back to the Aristotelian concept of 
habit (hexis), the capacity acquired through usage and exercise, custom and habituation, 
in a word, through self-constitution. What is at stake is to rescue this concept from the 
Aristotelian template of potential and act: to think being-in-use (essere-in-uso) as distinct 
from being-in-act, as ‘habitual use’ (uso abituale) that is always already in use, habitually, 
and does not presuppose a potential that must at a certain point pass into the act. 
Habitual use is ‘a potential that is never separate from act, which never needs to be put 
to work’ (UB 58). 
The negative aspect of the conceptual task proposed to us by Agamben is that of 
ceasing to think habit as a potential put into use and exercised through a sovereign act 
of the will or decision – that is, ceasing to think habit (literally, ‘having’, hexis) as 
something ‘had’ by a subject, which, as Aristotle himself notes, would amount to an 
infinite regression of the having of having (UB 58–65, 276–7).45 The positive aspect of 
the task is to think habit as use, as usage or custom (ethos), that is, as a manner of 
constituting oneself as a subject by habitually making use of oneself and the world in a 
certain way: as a form-of-life. ‘Use, as habit, is a form-of-life and not the knowledge or faculty of a 
subject’ (UB 62). Only by thus ‘deactivating’ the traditional split of habitual use into 
potential (habit) and act (use) will we be able to come to terms with the aporetic nature 
of Aristotle’s account of hexis as, on the one hand, a disposition (diathesis) for acting in a 
certain way that is, in itself, only constituted through previous activity and exercise (OD 
92–9).46  
This Foucault-inspired ontology of habit, of identities constituted through usage 
and practice and constantly retaining the ‘destituent’ capacity to undo themselves, 
captures the sense of the Apostle Paul’s experience of a messianic time in which 
ordained powers, norms and identities have been ‘rendered inoperative’ (katargein) by 
the advent of the messiah and in which what remains is to make use (chrēsai) of them 
for radically new purposes (UB 56–7, 273–4).47 This ontology extends itself towards the 
Heidegger-inspired ‘modal’ ontology, delineated in the second part of The Use of Bodies, 
that no longer sees identities in terms of Aristotelian stable and determinate substances 
(ousiai) but as ‘hypostases’, as ceaseless (re)configurations of a dynamic and self-
constituent process (UB 111–91). We are thus offered an ‘inoperative’ (argon) model of 
human life without any single preordained function or work – a possibility considered 
and immediately abandoned by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics (UB 5) – a life that 
‘lives only in use-of-itself, lives only (its) livability’ (UB 63).48 Agamben’s name for the 
self-constituting, self-destituting and self-reconfiguring process of inoperative living is 
form-of-life, that is, 
 
a life […] in which singular modes, acts, and processes of living are never 
simply facts but always and above all possibilities of life, always and above all 
potential. And potential, insofar as it is nothing other than the essence or 
nature of each being, can be suspended and contemplated but never 
absolutely divided from the act. The habit of a potential is the habitual use 
of it and the form-of-life of this use. The form of human living is never 
prescribed by a specific biological vocation nor assigned by any necessity 
whatsoever, but even though it is customary, repeated, and socially 
obligatory, it always preserves its character as a real possibility. (UB 207–8) 
 
We see that the Homo Sacer project has thus rewound to its point of departure, zōē 
and bios. In asserting their inseparability as form-of-life, a life that is never ‘bare’ or pre-
political but always constitutes and reconstitutes itself into some form or mode of life 
or other and is thus always already qualified and political, the conclusion of the project 
also, in a sense, retrieves the ‘originary’ concept of bios, which, as we have seen, is by no 
means an opposite of zōē or separable from it, but rather simply the form invariably 
assumed over time by the process of being alive. 
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